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Three alternative specifications of an investment equation have been tested using 
panel data of Uruguayan firms: a traditional accelerator model of investment, an 
error-correction version of the accelerator model and an Euler equation for the 
capital stock. These models of investment were used to test for the existence of 
financial constraints in the investment decision process. Our estimates confirm the 
existence of financial restrictions on investment decisions of Uruguayan firms in 
the period under consideration (1997-2000). We explored the effect on firms’ 
ability to finance investment of two attributes: size and foreign ownership. 
Regarding size, our results suggest that small firms face greater constraints in 
financing their desired levels of investment. We also explored whether foreign 
owned firms suffered less from financial restrictions than national firms. Our 
results leave the issue unresolved. Lastly, our estimates suggest a general increase 
in the severity of financial restrictions following the 1999-2000 crisis. In 
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  31. Introduction 
 
The development of the capital market in Uruguay did not accompany the deepening of the 
banking sector after the financial liberalization that took place in the 1970s. Instead, Uruguay can 
be considered a typical case of a bank-based financial system, as opposed to a market-based 
system in which the capital market plays an important role in determining firms’ financial 
structure. The main objective of this study is to evaluate the effect of financial restrictions on 
firms’ investment in the context of a system based on short-term credit by banks.  
As will be shown, there has been a recent expansion of the use of corporate bonds as a 
financing instrument, which creates several issues of interest. This instrument allowed some 
firms to finance restructuring projects that were extremely difficult to fund through the banking 
sector. On the other hand, there were recent default (or near-default) episodes that are 
reminiscent of agency problems and opportunistic behavior of shareholders over bondholders in 
the case of long-term debts. Those cases of default have discouraged investors from participating 
in the incipient capital market since 1998, at least with volumes similar to those registered in 
1996-1997. 
Macroeconomic shocks, like the Russian crises of 1998 and the devaluation of the Real in 
1999, have also been responsible for recent contractions in credit and in issues of corporate 
bonds to the market. A second objective of the paper is to evaluate the impact of that change in 
the economic and credit conditions on the investment decisions of firms. 
An additional area of interest is to evaluate how firms’ characteristics impact their access 
to credit. The third objective of the paper is to test whether firm attributes such as size and 
ownership structure (foreign versus domestically owned) matter in determining the availability 
of financial resources. 
The second section of the paper includes a brief analysis of the macroeconomic 
environment of Uruguay, emphasizing the relative importance of the credit market. Some 
indicators of the financial system of Uruguay will be provided, showing the strong importance of 
the banking sector as a supplier of funds to firms. The evolution of the capital market as a 
supplier of funds will also be analyzed, showing its expansion and contraction in the second half 
of the 1990s. 
 
  5The third section will present the model to be used to address the issue of financial 
constraints at the firm level. Based on the neoclassical firm-profit-maximizer paradigm, two 
models of investment under intertemporal optimization will be used. In the first, financial 
constraints are introduced explicitly. This model leads to an Euler equation that will be used for 
empirical purposes. In order to compare the empirical results of the Euler equation with other 
specifications, other models in the traditional investment-accelerator approach will be 
formulated. These models will imply a long run relationship between capital and output (in 
levels or in differences, depending on the specification). An augmented version of these models 
will be estimated and used to draw conclusions on the presence of financial constraints.  
The fourth section will deal with the empirical implementation of the models and their 
estimations. The data set will be introduced, and several methodological issues will be discussed. 
The fifth section will present the results for both models. The sixth section concludes.  
 
2. Macroeconomic  Environment and the Financial Market 
 
The last two years have been characterized by an intense and long depression that has troubled 
the country and the productive sector. GDP growth has been mildly negative during this period. 
As shown in the following chart, private investment dropped 14 percent in 1999 and another 14 
percent in 2000. Nevertheless, the government has been successful in keeping the fiscal deficit 
under control. This has greatly benefited the country’s image in international capital markets and 
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  6Uruguay has a relatively developed financial system, a la “European,” characterized by 
heavily concentrated public banking and a few local banks. Stability, especially as compared to 
Uruguay’s neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, makes the country’s financial markets a safe haven 
in relative terms. This situation leads to a high amount of total deposits, especially by non-
Uruguayan account-holders. 
Overall, the financial sector has exhibited stable behavior and is currently undergoing a 
slow process of consolidation and mergers, as well as a restructuring of its institutions to 
accommodate the number of firms to the size of the market. In 2001 actions were taken to ensure 
the sale and restructuring of troubled institutions, and banking institutions are developing a 
whole range of new products in accordance with the global trends. Given these adjustments, 
average profitability has been acceptable despite the recession.  
 
Table 1.
Issues of Private Sector Debt











(*) thousands of dollars
Source: Banco Central del Uruguay.  
 
The Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1999) database on financial systems development 
confirms the favorable position of the Uruguayan banking system in comparison with the region. 
It has: 
•  ratios of overhead costs and bank net interest margin lower than those of 
Argentina and Brazil; 
•  a ratio of liquid liabilities over GDP higher than those of Argentina and 
Brazil; and 
  7•  higher bank assets to GDP ratio and higher claims of deposit money banks on 
private sector to GDP ratio than Argentina, and similar ratios to those of 
Brazil. 
 
But when the indicators of the Uruguayan banking system are considered in a wider 
environment, there seems to be a long road ahead to achieve a well-developed financial system. 
The indicators of banking development for Uruguay in the Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine database 
are below world averages, and so it is considered, in this classification, as an underdeveloped 
banking system. Whether this restricts firms’ ability firms to invest is the main issue to be 
examined in this paper. 
The Uruguayan capital market is even less developed. The market capitalization as 
percentage of GDP is less than 1 percent, total value traded is almost insignificant and the 
turnover ratio (the value of stock transactions relative to the size of the market) is around 3 
percent. World averages, according to the Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine database, are 39 percent, 
17 percent and 35 percent, respectively. 
Given these figures, Uruguay can be classified as an underdeveloped bank-based 
economy, as opposed to a market-based system. Correspondingly, capital markets have played a 
minimal role in the development of the financial sources of funds. In 1990 the market value of 
private sector securities accounted for only US$ 0.8 million out of a US$ 721 million securities 
market. The first figure represents the value of stock outstanding, constituting the only private 
sector securities at that point. In comparison, total bank deposits in both local and foreign 
currency accounted for US$ 10,747 million, while total loans accounted for US$ 7,401 million in 
1995 on average. 
Uruguay experienced a period of strong growth between 1996 and 1998, and as is usual, 
during that period the credit of the banking sector experienced a pro-cyclical evolution. The 
credit of the private banking sector (the state-owned Banco de la República is excluded because 
its behavior cannot be characterized as profit-maximizing) to the domestic private non-financial 
sector grew at an average rate of 18 percent a year in real terms between December 1995 and 
December 1998. 
 
  8Table 2.
Total Outstanding Debt in the Financial Market










(*) millions of dollars, end of year.
Source: Banco Central del Uruguay.  
 
After the Central Bank introduced prudential restrictions for the banking sector at the end 
of 1998, the growth rate of private banks’ credits to the domestic non-financial sector (excluding 
the government) declined to 3.8 percent a year in 1999 and 2000. In addition to the impact that 
macroeconomic conditions may have had on investment, another issue worth addressing is 
whether this tightening in financial conditions has affected firms’ decisions to invest. 
Its small size notwithstanding, the Uruguayan capital market also experienced an 
expansion cycle, which was supported by institutional changes, followed by a contraction phase. 
Starting in 1996, new legislation and rulings regarding private sector debt (Obligaciones 
Negociables) were introduced. Before that, in 1994, the maximum amount that could be issued 
by each firm was set at the equivalent of 50 percent of capital. In 1996, the Law of Securities 
Markets (Law Nº 16.749) was passed. This law established the issuing procedure and the role 
that the Central Bank had to play with regard to transparency and investor information (among 
other requirements), and helped with the organization of formal markets. The market then grew 
rapidly until 1999. 
Other legislation organized and favored the securities market such as the Mutual Funds 
Law (Law Nº 16.774) and the Pension Funds Law (Law Nº 16.713). The Mutual Funds Law set 
up and regulated mutual funds and how they could invest in each type of security. The Pension 
Law (Law Nº 16713) set the percentage of private sector securities that each pension fund could 
have in its portfolio.  
As mentioned above, with respect to private bonds and commercial paper, the new law of 
1996 created a more adequate regulatory framework for private paper. The results were 
  9immediate, and new private issues accounted for around 20 percent of capitalization in 1997 and 
1998. Around that time most sizable firms were family owned and managed, which in some 
instances bore undesirable consequences in capital markets. Unfortunately, the level of leverage 
for private issuing firms was far from desirable, and this adversely affected the market and its 
credibility when the first default became public. Worse still, the case proved to be a conspicuous 
scam: the resulting scandal affected all private issues and had a chilling effect on new issues. 
This brought about a series of new regulations regarding credit rating and information disclosure. 
The year 2000 witnessed a fall in the total financial market debt outstanding for the first 
time in a seven-year period. This can be seen in Table 2, where total security debt fell by nearly 
US$ 70 million, or about 9 percent. Nevertheless, a closer look at the figures raises additional 
concerns. First, there has been a significant change in the sector distribution of private sector 
debt, as can be seen in Table 3 and Table 4. In the year 2000, more than 75 percent of the new 
issues are from financial firms, compared to less than 40 percent in 1996. There has been a steep 
fall not only in total issues, but also in issues by non-financial firms. 
 
Table 3.
Debt Capitalization in Percentages
1996 2000
Financial Sector 35% 66%






Source: Banco Central del Uruguay.
Table 4.
Percentage of Dollar Amount
1996 2000
New Issues 19% 9%
Financial Sector 40% 75%
Non-Financial Sector 60% 25%
Source: Banco Central del Uruguay.  
 
  10The previous description suggests interesting issues to be analyzed in relation to the 
behavior of investment and the conditions of financial markets. As noted above, Uruguay 
experienced soft credit conditions until 1999, both because of the expansion of domestic credit 
and the appearance of new financial instruments in the capital market, despite its small size. 
After the Brazilian crises and other external shocks since the end of 1998, along with problems 
involving domestic firms that went to the market in previous years and experienced default or 
near-default or default problems, conditions in the financial market became more stringent. 
Whether the decrease in investment in 1999 and 2000 is related to more severe credit conditions 
or is just the consequence of a demand slowdown, is a question to be addressed in the fourth 
section. First, the theoretical framework for the analysis will be illustrated in the following 
section 
 
3. The  Theoretical  Model 
 
Two theoretical approaches will be used as a framework for the empirical analysis carried out in 
this paper. The first approach derives the optimal level of the capital stock as a function of output 
and the user cost of capital. Then a specific mechanism of adjustment between desired and actual 
levels of capital is assumed and as a consequence, an investment equation is obtained. As a 
second alternative, the financial constraints will be explicitly introduced in the investment 
decision process of a profit-maximizing firm. The first-order conditions of the optimization 
process will help to derive an Euler equation that relates the investment ratio of the firm to 
financial variables and other determinants. 
 
3.1.  An Accelerator Model of Investment with Error Correction 
 
This first approach is more flexible (and ad hoc) than the approach to be presented in sub-section 
3.2 below. Firms are assumed to be profit maximizers, but financial constraints are not explicitly  
introduced, nor is the decision to pay dividends or to issue new shares modelled. Therefore, a 
firm’s problem is to maximize: 
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  11  ( ) IK K tt t = − − − 1 1 δ  (2) 
 
where E is the conditional expectations operator,  p is output price,  ( ) F ⋅  is a gross value - added 




δ  is the depreciation rate.  
If the price of firm output and the price of the investment goods are constant over time, 
the steady state solution is: 
 





















where uc denotes the user cost of capital. 
If prices are allowed to vary over time, the solution has an extra term.  
 




































δ δ    (4) 
 
The extra term on the right hand side of equation (4) reflects the capital gain (or loss) due 
to a change in prices. 
Assuming a functional form for the production function it is possible to obtain the basic 
relationship between capital and output. Under a Cobb-Douglas specification, 
 equation (4) can be rewritten as:  ()
β α







K α =  (5) 
and taking logs 
 
  t t t h y k + =  (6) 
where  t t uc h log log − = α . 
 
Under a more general CES production function like 
 


















+ = = t t t t t t N K A N K F Y  
 
the relation between capital and output is: 
 




















− = and  σ and  ν are 
respectively the elasticities of substitution and scale.  
Both equations (6) and (6’) imply that the long run capital level is proportional to output 
(and more generally to sales) and a term reflecting the user cost of capital and the parameters of 
the production function.
2 
Consider now a specific firm. Since adjustment is not instantaneous, the following 
dynamic adjustment specification between capital and output, provided by sales, is explored: 
 
  it it it it it h y y k k + + + + = − − 1 1 0 1 1 0 β β γ α  (7) 
 
Rewriting it in error correction form 
 
  () [ ] ( ) it it it it it it h y y k y k + + + − + − − + ∆ + = ∆ − − − 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 β β γ γ β α  (8) 
 
Besides the  term, the growth rate of capital depends on the growth rate of sales, an 
error correction term and a scale factor. 
t h
When estimating equation (8) it is assumed that the term reflecting the user cost of capital 
and parameters of the production function can be controlled including year specific and firm 




I  is also used to proxy the growth rate of capital. 
Finally, equation (8) is augmented with the profit to capital ratio, to control for financial 
constraints in this relationship. Summing up, the equation to be estimated is: 
 
                                                           
2 Note that (6) is a particular case of (6’) when  1 = σ . 
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(9) 
where  t i it it d + + = α ε η  and  it Π  represent the profits of firm i at time t.  
 
The error correction coefficient  1 1 − γ  is expected to be negative, implying that when the 
capital level is above the desired level, investment will be lower. The scale coefficient 
1 0 1 1 β β γ + + −  is also expected not to be statistically different from 0. If the profit terms capture 
only transitory effects, the sum of the coefficients on profits ϕ ϕ ϕ = + 01  would not be 
significant.  
Another possible specification of the investment equation is the traditional accelerator-
profit model that is derived by differencing equations like (7), removing the possibility of an 
equilibrium relationship of the variables in levels.
3 Using again the investment rate as a proxy for 
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 characterizes the long-run 
relationship between the variables in differences (sales growth and investment) and not in levels 
(sales and capital). 
 
3.2  Euler Equation Approach 
 
Now considered is a model of investment and financing decisions of firms where restrictions on 
debt-equity financing are explicitly introduced. These restrictions can be tested using an Euler 
equation approach, as in Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996), or by a more ad-hoc 
regression strategy (introduced in Section 3.1), as is more common in the literature. 
 
  14Firms are assumed to maximize their value for shareholders, given by: 
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τρ ,, , B t
 (12a) 
  ( ) IK K tt t = − − − 1 1 δ  (12b) 
   (12c)  Dt ≥ 0
   (12d)  Bt ≥ 0
   (12e)  Qt
n ≥ 0
where W is the value of the firm, D are dividends (or cash - flow),   is the nominal value of 
new shares, E is the conditional expectations operator, 
Q
n
τ  is the corporate tax rate, p is output 
price,   is a gross value - added function,  () F ⋅ ( ) G ⋅  is a convex adjustment cost function (both 
assumed to be linearly homogeneous), K can be interpreted as total assets or capital stock, N is 
labor, I is gross investment,   is the price of capital goods, v is the fiscal impact on the firm's 
flow of funds of the tax deductions from depreciation of the stock of capital, B is total debt, i is 
the risk-free rate of interest, and 
p
K
() ρ ⋅  is the premium per unit of debt, which can be expressed as 
a function of leverage (end of previous period B and K) and size (K again).
4 
Besides the restrictions (12), the firm may also be subject to financial constraints that 
could affect the leverage ratio. As in Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996), a restriction 







K −≥ 0 (13) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 The error-correction specification is a consequence of a long-run relationship between the variables in levels. If the 
error-correction is not a good description of the data process, then the variables in levels are not cointegrated and 
there is no long-run relationship between them. 
4 As the literature of agency costs on financing shows, problems of asymmetric information may introduce conflicts 
of interest between bondholders and stockholders, which result in a higher premium on the risk-free rate of interest 
as the leverage ratio (debt to total assets) increases. Other explanations rely on reasons not related with agency 
problems. Caprio and Demirgüc-Kunt (1997) survey theoretical arguments and show evidence on the intention of 
firms to match the maturity of assets and debts. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) also argue that firm size 
may be relevant for financing choices, because access to financial markets may be a function of size. 
  15 
From the first order conditions for K, I, N, B, and   of the problem of maximizing (11) 
subject to (12) when (13) is not binding, the following Euler equation for the case of no financial 











































































































































































This equation determines the (incremental) investment to capital ratio as a function of the 
product-capital (or sales-capital) ratio and two terms that reflect the opportunity cost of capital. 

















































































































































































































This equation is similar to the one obtained for the no financial constraint case, equation 
(4), except for the inclusion of the last two terms. These terms incorporate the effect of the 
leverage ceiling on the investment ratio. 
Making the following assumptions from the expectations terms and after an appropriate 
parameterization of the adjustment cost function  ( ) ⋅ G  and the premium term  () ρ ⋅ , equation (5) 
can be estimated, as will be done in the following section: 
  16•  Rational expectations: this assumption implies that  ( ) 1 1 1 + + + + = t t t t u X X E , u 
being a white noise expectation error, not correlated with any period t 
information. 











•  Premium: The premium function  ( ) ⋅ ρ  is supposed to be linear in the debt to 












t t t K p
B c
I K ρ  
 where  c>0. 
 
Substituting these expressions for  ( ) ⋅ G  and  ( ) ⋅ ρ  in equations (14) and (15), and applying 
the rational expectations operator, the following parameterized Euler equations are obtained. 
Equation (14’) is the specification under the hypothesis of non-binding financial constraints and 

































































































































































































































                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 For details in this procedure see Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996). 
  17 
Note that the suffix i has been introduced to denote firms.  
 
In these equations, f is a fixed, firm-specific effect, while Year is a time-specific effect. 
These are the equations to be estimated in Section 5. 
 
4. Empirical  Tests 
 
4.1.  Data Set 
 
The data used was comprised of annual account data extracted from two main sources. The first 
source consists of financial statements of firms that report their accounting data to the 
Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores, at the Central Bank of Uruguay (which is the 
regulatory agency for the Uruguayan capital market). These are publicly traded firms and (for the 
most part) companies that issued corporate bonds through the capital market. The second source 
is the financial statements of firms that provide accounting data to the Liga de Defensa 
Comercial, a not-for-profit organization devoted to promoting transparency in the credit market. 
This organization usually prepares reports on the credit history of its affiliates, sometimes on the 
basis of financial statements. 
While companies that go public and issue of shares or corporate bonds are compelled to 
report their financial accounts to the Central Bank, the information provided to the Liga de 
Defensa Comercial is voluntary. Accounting data from 54 companies that report information to 
the Central Bank and 100 firms that do the same with the Liga de Defensa Comercial were 
collected. But most of that data was not useful in implementing the estimation of the models 
presented in the previous section, because the information was incomplete in many cases, and 
most firms only report financial statements to the Liga de Defensa Comercial occasionally. 
Two types of adjustments were made to the raw data, as described in the Appendix. First, 
all the financial statements were expressed in terms of pesos of December 2000. The second 
adjustment tries to estimate the result of having nominal accounts exposed to inflation in the 
financial statements. This correction typically affects the financial results of the firm and 
attempts to remove inflationary distortions from net income. While most of the firms make 
adjustments for valuation of the fixed assets, and they are usually presented as values at the end 
of the fiscal year, the other items of the financial statements are presented as historical values. 
  18This causes a problem when the financial results are presented, because interest on loans 
denominated in local currency is expressed in nominal terms, while loans denominated in foreign 
currencies explicitly introduce an adjustment for devaluation. The correction of financial 
statements for inflation must express interest payments in real terms as explained in the 
Appendix.  
Information about the ownership structure of firms was also collected, identifying those 
companies controlled by foreign entities or with significant foreign participation (including in 
this definition all firms in which foreign shareholders possess at least 30 percent of total shares) 
and those that belong to national investors (the rest). 
At the end, an unbalanced panel of 56 firms with at least five consecutive years of data of 
all the variables included in the models to be estimated was constructed. Summary information 




















  19Table 5.
Summary of Indicators: 1995-2000
Concept 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Investment
  Gross investment/Fixed Assets 14.1% 22.4% 31.4% 34.9% 23.6% 20.1%
      Old firms 11.7% 19.8% 28.1% 32.4% 21.3% 22.6%
      New firms 45.9% 53.2% 61.1% 59.8% 42.0% 9.1%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 3.0% 19.8% 35.5% 37.9% 22.9% 7.4%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 21.4% 26.4% 24.4% 27.9% 25.3% 41.3%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 12.3% 18.8% 32.1% 30.1% 24.8% 5.9%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 15.8% 24.2% 30.4% 39.7% 19.5% 35.1%
  Net investment/Fixed Assets 4.7% 6.9% 14.5% 21.6% 12.6% 13.3%
      Old firms 2.4% 4.1% 10.4% 18.4% 9.6% 15.1%
      New firms 34.9% 40.3% 51.1% 54.5% 35.8% 5.3%
      Smaller than average (total assets) -8.1% 2.5% 16.3% 24.1% 11.4% 0.7%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 12.4% 13.7% 11.3% 15.6% 15.2% 34.2%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 6.0% 3.8% 15.5% 17.6% 14.0% -0.3%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 3.0% 7.5% 12.5% 24.3% 7.6% 27.1%
Activity and Growth
   Sales growth (%) NA 4.3% 36.2% 14.5% 1.2% 9.1%
      Old firms NA 3.3% 23.5% 6.5% -1.3% 10.3%
      New firms NA 51.8% 165.5% 117.6% 26.2% 2.7%
      Smaller than average (total assets) NA 0.1% 50.0% 6.5% 1.9% 3.2%
      Bigger than average (total assets) NA 10.0% 13.0% 31.7% -0.4% 19.9%
      Smaller than average (total sales) NA -0.2% 52.0% 14.9% 0.7% -0.5%
      Bigger than average (total sales) NA 9.0% 8.1% 13.7% 2.1% 21.5%
   Asset turnover (Sales/Total assets) 133.1% 132.3% 142.8% 132.5% 109.5% 61.8%
      Old firms 138.4% 145.1% 153.5% 143.2% 122.3% 71.8%
      New firms 34.8% 43.4% 42.2% 28.4% 25.7% 24.6%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 163.6% 154.0% 166.7% 152.1% 124.4% 64.6%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 70.3% 79.8% 84.4% 79.7% 66.0% 57.0%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 136.1% 129.5% 144.7% 133.3% 109.3% 42.7%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 146.7% 157.4% 160.0% 141.5% 127.1% 93.8%
Profitability
   Net operating income/Sales (%) 13.0% 10.6% 11.1% 10.6% 4.4% 0.1%
      Old firms 12.7% 10.3% 10.7% 9.7% 5.6% 1.0%
      New firms 28.5% 13.8% 15.6% 22.5% -8.5% -4.4%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 13.4% 11.4% 11.2% 11.8% 5.9% -1.4%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 12.1% 9.0% 10.9% 7.5% 0.2% 1.7%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 13.7% 10.0% 11.0% 10.4% 2.1% -5.6%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 12.0% 11.8% 11.3% 11.0% 8.8% 7.5%
   Net operating income/Total assets (%) 16.8% 14.2% 13.1% 10.6% 7.8% 2.5%
      Old firms 17.2% 15.0% 13.7% 11.0% 8.4% 3.3%
      New firms 9.6% 8.8% 7.8% 7.1% 3.9% -0.2%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 20.8% 16.9% 14.3% 12.0% 8.8% 1.8%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 8.5% 7.7% 10.3% 7.1% 5.0% 3.7%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 19.4% 15.1% 13.9% 10.4% 6.7% -0.6%










  20Table  5.   (continued)
Summary of Indicators: 1995-2000
Concept 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
   Net income/Sales (%) 20.0% 13.3% 6.9% 5.4% -6.7% -9.4%
      Old firms 20.0% 10.0% 6.0% 4.7% -0.3% -7.0%
      New firms 22.8% 47.3% 17.2% 14.0% -74.6% -22.3%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 13.8% 13.5% 7.3% 6.6% 1.7% -11.7%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 33.9% 13.0% 6.1% 2.2% -30.8% -6.6%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 25.8% 15.4% 6.4% 5.0% -11.1% -18.7%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 11.4% 9.6% 7.9% 6.2% 1.8% 2.7%
   Net income/Net worth (%) 44.5% 34.1% 29.8% 19.1% 0.7% -8.9%
      Old firms 45.2% 34.8% 29.9% 19.2% 1.6% -8.6%
      New firms 24.3% 28.8% 28.1% 18.6% -6.2% -10.1%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 50.8% 40.6% 36.0% 23.6% 1.5% -14.4%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 31.2% 19.1% 14.9% 7.1% -1.8% -0.1%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 59.0% 40.1% 32.4% 22.9% -4.9% -22.1%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 24.7% 25.6% 22.1% 12.0% 9.6% 5.7%
Leverage and Liquidity
   Total debt/Total assets (%) 55.0% 58.3% 58.7% 60.7% 57.1% 59.5%
      Old firms 54.5% 60.0% 58.2% 61.3% 58.3% 59.8%
      New firms 64.6% 46.5% 64.0% 54.4% 49.0% 58.4%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 55.7% 59.3% 60.1% 63.5% 57.2% 61.8%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 53.6% 55.9% 55.4% 52.9% 56.7% 55.6%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 55.9% 61.3% 59.4% 63.3% 57.4% 63.0%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 53.8% 55.7% 55.4% 57.6% 62.3% 60.6%
   Financial debt/Net assets (%) 39.6% 44.6% 38.6% 40.3% 42.7% 53.0%
      Old firms 38.6% 45.8% 37.4% 39.4% 42.3% 52.2%
      New firms 56.6% 35.7% 50.2% 49.1% 45.0% 55.8%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 37.1% 43.5% 35.8% 39.9% 40.4% 55.0%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 44.6% 47.3% 45.5% 41.4% 49.3% 49.5%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 39.3% 47.7% 37.5% 40.1% 42.4% 58.3%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 39.1% 41.3% 40.0% 41.8% 47.4% 51.3%
   Long-term debt/Net worth (times) 0.351 0.529 0.793 0.977 1.010 1.362
      Old firms 0.350 0.507 0.716 0.943 0.943 0.713
      New firms 0.368 0.681 1.510 1.314 1.448 3.771
      Smaller than average (total assets) 0.305 0.547 0.543 1.117 0.813 1.912
      Bigger than average (total assets) 0.442 0.484 1.397 0.602 1.586 0.399
      Smaller than average (total sales) 0.384 0.699 0.872 1.085 1.142 2.117
      Bigger than average (total sales) 0.309 0.250 0.447 0.767 0.841 0.619
   Current ratio (%) 153.9% 143.5% 192.9% 173.6% 164.3% 116.8%
      Old firms 153.7% 144.2% 190.3% 174.6% 165.1% 111.1%
      New firms 158.2% 138.9% 216.9% 162.6% 157.4% 141.2%
      Smaller than average (total assets) 172.5% 157.3% 216.9% 189.1% 178.9% 107.1%
      Bigger than average (total assets) 115.8% 110.1% 134.4% 132.5% 121.0% 133.0%
      Smaller than average (total sales) 158.9% 149.9% 208.0% 198.9% 189.3% 118.7%
      Bigger than average (total sales) 140.4% 135.1% 139.4% 127.6% 122.0% 110.1%
Source: Authors' calculations from database.
 
Indicators of investment show a picture roughly similar to that described for the country 
as a whole in the first section. Both gross and net investment grew until 1998, then suffered a 
strong contraction in 1999, when Uruguay confronted the macroeconomic problems associated 
with the devaluation of the Brazilian Real at the beginning of the year. During the year 2000, the 
investment ratios remained low, with a notable decrease in investment by new firms, which 
showed the higher investment rates during the period considered. 
 
  21When firms are classified according to their size, and the value of total assets is used as 
an indicator of size, investment ratios tend to be higher in bigger firms. When companies are 
classified by taking sales into account, the investment ratios have a similar evolution in small and 
large firms, which suggests some kind of proportionality between investment and sales. 
The indicators of activity also provide a good synthesis of the scenario that Uruguay 
confronted during the second half of the last decade. Sales growth increased until 1997 and then 
began to decelerate. Asset turnover (sales/total assets) has also slowed since 1997, causing 
deterioration in profitability ratios, as will be shown below. The asset turnover ratio tends to be 
higher in larger firms, when they are defined according to their assets value. Again, the 
distinction between large and small firms is not so clear when they are classified by sales 
volume. 
The profitability ratios showed a steady decline during the period considered, with 
notable reductions in 1999 and 2000. The net operating income (income before financial charges 
and taxes) became almost zero in 1999 and 2000, while net income became negative in the last 
two years of the period. There is no clear distinction in the relative performance of large and 
small firms during the recent crisis. When size is defined according to total assets, small firms 
performed better in 1999, but when total sales is used as an indicator, the picture is the opposite. 
On a different dimension, the recession seems to have more substantially affected the results of 
new firms, defined as those created during the 1990s. 
The ratios of indebtedness were remarkably stable during the period under study, and 
were very similar for all types of firms. Old firms tend to have larger leverage ratios than new 
firms (consistent with the hypothesis that stressed the importance of age in access to credit), and 
large firms tend to be more indebted than the small ones (which is also consistent with the 
theories that emphasize the importance of collateral in the determination of financial structure). 
But all types of companies analyzed showed leverage ratios around 60 percent during the last 
five years. 
While profitability declined, financial debts increased their importance as the funding 
instrument for working capital, as the Financial Debt/Net Assets ratio shows. This trend is visible 
for all types of companies described. Moreover, as profits were reduced and eventually became 
negative, the net worth of firms grew less than total assets, so long-term debt increased its 
importance as a mean of long-term financing. 
  22The stability of the leverage ratio notwithstanding, the current ratio (Current 
Assets/Current Liabilities) experienced a pronounced decline during the last two years, 
indicating the relative increase in short-term financing instruments as a source of funds with 
respect to other mechanisms, including the internal generation of resources. The latter source of 
funds, which is related with the capacity of the firms to obtain profits, has been negatively 
affected by the current economic recession. 
 
4.2  Estimation Issues 
 
Two broad strategies can be followed to test whether constraints on financing decisions are 
relevant to the investment process of the firms. One approach uses the Euler equation derived 
from the maximization problem outlined above. As Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999) pointed 
out, the Euler equation method allows dealing with the problem of expectations regarding future 
profitability of the investment. Average profitability, the product to capital ratio and the one-
period ahead expected change in the adjustment costs of investment are all that is needed to 
describe the change in expectations of the future profitability of investments. The Euler equation 
approach does not require computing the Tobin’s q ratio, which is very difficult in markets like 
that of Uruguay, where only a few firms trade their shares in a stock exchange. 
To allow for the potential endogeneity of the regressors in the Euler equation, the GMM 
method will be used (see Hansen, 1982, and Arellano and Bond, 1991, on the application of the 
GMM method in panel data and Hansen and Singleton, 1982, on application of the GMM 
method to first-order conditions). The significance of the additional parameters included in the 
binding restriction model will make it possible to draw conclusions about the relevance of 
financial constraints in the investment decision. The only difference between equations (14’) and 
(15’) is the sign of the debt term and the appearance of a term with the square of debt in the 
restricted case. Nevertheless, it is necessary to warn that the results from an Euler equation 
approach are very sensitive to the specification of the model. In the present case, the 
specification of the () ρ ⋅  and G  functions can introduce an arbitrary structure in the equation to 
be estimated.  
() ⋅
For this reason, the results obtained from Euler equations are supplemented with the use 
of an error-correction formulation and the traditional accelerator-profit model, as in equations (9) 
and (10) in Subsection 3.1. In fact, the error correction equation (9) and the accelerator-profit 
  23model (10) are not very different from the Euler equation (15’), so the two methodologies can 
shed light on the same phenomenon despite the different macroeconomic foundations. 
The estimation procedure for equations of the type (9), (10) and (15’) using panel data 
has traditionally dealt with the “permanent unobservable differences” across firms included in 
the error term by one of two methods: i)carrying out within-firm transformation (subtracting 
from each variable the time-average over the sample period) or ii) first-differencing the data. 
Consider the usual linear regression model written for panel data with firm and year 
effects: 
  yx d it it i t it = + + + β α ε  (16) 
 
with  i N = 1K ,  t T = 1K ,   is the variable to be explained,   is the vector of 
explanatory variables (including lagged  ) and 
yit xit
yit αi and   are firm-specific and time-specific 
effects, respectively. The year-specifities can be addressed by year dummies, but possible 
problems arise from the 
dt
αi, which if ignored can introduce persistent serial correlation of the 
residuals. The within transformation eliminates αi, but does not make it possible to obtain 
consistent estimates if the variables on the right hand side are endogenous or predetermined. This 
problem will be addressed by first-differencing, in which case equation (16) becomes: 
 
  ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ yx d it it t it = + + β ε  (17) 
 
These “first differences estimates” are free from potential correlated effects due to 
unobserved firm-specific factors that are constant over time. 
In the present model, it is highly probable that the dependent variable and some of the 
explanatory variables are simultaneously determined, introducing biases into the estimations. To 
deal with this problem, GMM estimates based on instrumenting the equation (17) by the lagged 
level values of the variables were conducted. The statistical package DPD for Ox was used to 
perform the estimations (Arellano, Bond and Doornik, 1997). 
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5. Results 
 
5.1.  The Accelerator Model of Investment with Error Correction: The Traditional 
Approach 
 
For purposes of comparison the presentation begins by showing in Table 6 the within regression 
results for equation (9). As in all the regressions, the estimates are for the period 1997-2000, and 
dummies for each year are included (but their estimates not reported). While data for the period 
1995-2000 is available, the first two years will allow for lags of order two to serve as instruments 
in estimation. 
The results for the basic equation are presented, as well as for several augmented 
equations that attempt to capture the effects of firm size and type of ownership. A priori larger 
and foreign-owned firms are expected to suffer less from financial constraints. In regard to 
foreign firms, conventional wisdom sees the acquisition of a foreign partner as a sign of strength 
for a firm. This strength can be the result of brand name reputation, the inflow of new capital, 
more efficient internal organization or new (and probably more aggressive) strategic 
competition. In any event, foreign participation should ease the fundraising efforts of firms. 
As mentioned in Section 3, larger firms are expected to experience fewer financial 
restrictions than smaller firms. There are at least two reasons why smaller firms can be expected 
to face tighter financial restrictions. Public information about smaller firms in general is worse 
than information about larger firms, and there are no easy ways to solve this asymmetry in order 
to attract investors. Moreover, larger firms may be able to offer larger collateral, which in many 
cases is required for longer-term loans.  
Firm size is defined on the basis of average capital. The dummy variable Size takes the 
value of one for all firms with capital level above average capital. There is also a dummy 
variable taking the value of one for all firms with more than 70 percent national ownership (i.e., 
Origin=1 is the approximation for a national firm).  
Also of interest is interaction of relevant variables with the effects of the 1999-2000 
Crisis. Several alternatives are explored, but only two are reported here: a dummy for the post 
crisis years of 1999 and 2000, and one for the spread between foreign and domestic currency 
denominated interest rates. This spread reflects the expected devaluation of the local currency, 
given the high dollarization of the Uruguayan economy, and higher expected devaluation implies 
higher firm liabilities and lower access to funds.  
  25In all specifications, the error-correction term has the correct sign and is significant. But 
the lagged sales term is also significant and its coefficient very similar to the error-correction 
term. Implicitly then, the two sales terms cancel and the investment-capital ratio is linked to the 
lagged log of capital.  
More important, also in all specifications, the coefficient estimates of the current and 
lagged terms of the proxy for cash inflows
6 are positive and significant. This is consistent with 
the presence of financial restrictions. Moreover, liquidity constraints are not temporary and are 
not eliminated in the following periods.  
Other proxies for liquidity constraints were explored, such as net income, net operating 
income and a cash approximation, calculated as net income plus depreciation of capital, all 
scaled by the capital stock. The results do not differ too much, with all the coefficients being of 
similar order. Net investment (also scaled by capital) is the dependent variable in all the error-
correction and accelerator equations. Gross investment was also used, but the results were robust 




                                                           
6 The proxy for cash inflows is the contribution margin less interest payments. The contribution margin is calculated 
as net operating income (earnings before interests and taxes) plus capital depreciation.  
  26 Table 6. 
Error-Correction Model for I/K 
Within Estimates, 1997-2000 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G) 
Usable observations   213  213  213  213  213  213  213 
Dy (t)  0.242***  0.255***  0.233***  0.271***  0.239**  0.245***  0.240*** 
(0.125)  (0.124)  (0.124)  (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.125) 
k-y (t-1)   -0.869***   0.869***   -0.882***   -0.842***   -0.867***   -0.880***   -0.884***
(0.120)  (0.118)  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.119)  (0.119) 
y (t-1)   -0.932***   -0.935***   -0.945***   -0.901***   -0.933***   -0.946***   -0.941***
(0.110)  (0.109)  (0.110)  (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.110) 
C/K (t)  0.108***  0.110***  0.020  0.104***  0.151**  0.050  0.014 
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.056)  (0.028)  (0.093)  (0.126)  (0.056) 
C/K (t-1)  0.234***  0.233***  0.259***  0.110  0.234***  0.256***  0.261*** 
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.092)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Sum of C coef.  0.342  0.343  0.309  0.214  0.385  0.306  0.274 
Size*C/K (t)   -0.438***   -0.415*** 
(0.210)  (0.212) 
Crisis*C/K (t)  0.094**  0.380  0.081 
(0.057)  (1.319)  (0.060) 
Crisis*C/K (t-1)  4.085* 
(2.905) 
Origin*C/K (t)  -0.042  -0.016 
(0.091)  (0.094) 
(1-Size)*Cri*C/K(t)  0.101** 
(0.057) 
R-squared  0.789  0.795  0.793  0.792  0.789  0.798  0.793 
Wald  530  546  539  535  528  550  541 
Notes: I/K, net investment over capital at the beginning of the period; Dy, first difference in log of sales; k, log of capital,
           y, log of sales; C/K, contribution margin (net operating income plus capital depreciation) over capital at  the beginning
           of the period; Size, a dummy with value 1 for firms with capital greater than average; Crisis in columns C, F and G
           is a dummy with value 1 for years 1999 and 2000, in column D is  the spread between foreign and domestic currency
           denominated interest rates; Origin in column E and F has a  value 1 for firms with less than 30% foreign ownership.
           Standard errors in parentheses. 
           ***significant at 5%, **significant at 10%, *significant at 15%  
 
 
  27The within results in column A of Table 6 are consistent with the existence of financial 
constraints on investment in the period under consideration. More convincing information is 
contained in the following columns. The regression allowing for an interaction with size is in 
column B, and with the crisis variables in columns C and D. Column E splits by ownership. 
Column F includes the three interactions together, and column G presents what happened with 
small firms after the crisis. 
The estimate of the product of the size dummy and the cash proxy are negative, 
suggesting that larger firms experience lower or no financial constraints. The coefficient 
estimates of both crisis proxies have the expected sign, suggesting that financial constraints on 
Uruguayan firms have increased during the recent recession. However, their significance level is 
not high (10 percent and 15 percent, respectively). The coefficient of the interaction with type of 
ownership is not statistically or economically significant.  
Given the significance of size and crisis, explored the effects of the crisis for small firms 
are explored.
7 The results of Column G imply that small firms were especially adversely affected 
after the Crisis.   
Given the strong significance of the lagged capital sales difference and the lagged 
difference, it seems appropriate to experiment with a different specification like the accelerator 
model of equation (10). 
As Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999) point out, the error-correction specification (9) can 
be seen as a reparameterization of the basic equation (7) in levels, while the simple accelerator 
model of (10) is derived from first-differencing equation (7). If the “permanent unobservable 
differences” are present only in the equation in levels, they are still present in the error-correction 
specification and the “within estimates” are the appropriate procedure. But in the case of the 
accelerator specification, the firm specific effects are removed when equation (7) is first-
differenced. For this reason, “total estimates” of the equation (10) are presented in Table 7, 
column A1. However, to account for the possibility of different trends in capital and output 
growth rates at the firm level, the within estimator is also computed and included in column A2. 
 
                                                           
7 Double and triple interactions between size, crisis and origin were also explored, but they are not reported here. 
These results are available from the authors upon request.  
  28As in the case of the error-correction formulation, proxies to account for size, origin and 
the 1999-2000 crisis are included. Both the individual and the sum of the coefficients of the 
liquidity variable are positive, with the same implication as in the error correction specification.  
Qualitatively, the accelerator model reflects the same conclusions as the Error Correction 
formulation. Column B shows the negative coefficient estimate for the product of size and cash, 
indicating that larger firms suffer less from financial constraints. Moreover, the magnitude in 
absolute value of this estimate is basically the same as the sum of the cash variables. Thus for 
large firms there are no financial constraints. Column D shows that the coefficient of the 
interaction of cash flow with the spread between domestic and foreign currency denominated 
interest rates lagged one period has the expected sign and is significant. Finally, foreign or 
national ownership does not seem to play a relevant role in explaining financial constraints on 
investment.  
 
  29Table 7.
Accelerator Model for I/K
Total and Within Estimates, 1997-2000
Total
(A1) (A2) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Usable observations 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213
I/K (t-1) 0.004  -0.034**  -0.036**  -0.037** -0.026  -0.034**  -0.038**  -0.038**
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.205) (0.021)
Dy (t) 0.619*** 0.459*** 0.475*** 0.455*** 0.487*** 0.458*** 0.471*** 0.458***
(0.122) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116)
C/K (t)  -0.055*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.068 0.129*** 0.159* 0.111 0.051
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.069) (0.033) (0.112) (0.155) (0.069)
C/K (t-1) 0.172*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.330*** 0.084*** 0.309*** 0.326*** 0.336***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.113) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029)
Sum of C coef. 0.116 0.445 0.447 0.398 0.213 0.468 0.437 0.387
Size*C/K (t)  -0.444**  -0.431**
(0.258) (0.261)








R-squared 0.378 0.683 0.690 0.686 0.695 0.684 0.691 0.687
Wald 117 306 313 308 319 305 312 309
Notes: Variable definitions in Table 6.
          ***significant at 5%, **significant at 10%, *significant at 15%
Within
 
  305.2  GMM Estimators of the Error Correction and Accelerator Model 
 
The within estimates cannot deal with problems of biases caused by random measurement errors 
in the right-hand side variables, simultaneity between contemporaneous right-hand variables and 
the disturbance and the predetermined nature of some of the right hand side variables. To deal 
with these problems, an instrumental variable method of estimation is needed. In the case of 
correlation of the disturbances over time, the strategy usually implemented is the General 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation applied to the model in first differences.  
The first problem with GMM estimates is the selection of the instruments for the 
differenced variables. If residuals are not serially correlated, the lagged levels of the variables 
included in the regression starting from the second lag are candidates for instruments.  
The First Difference GMM estimates
8 are presented in Table 8 for the error-correction 
model and in Table 9 for the simple accelerator model. The cash flow coefficient tends to be 
smaller compared to the within estimates of Tables 6 and 7. The signs of all the relevant 
coefficients are similar to the ones reported there. The cash flow coefficients are significantly 
positive. Large firms have a smaller cash flow coefficient, but the difference between large and 
small is not statistically significant. Financial constraints are greater in the crisis period. In that 
period smaller firms suffer significantly more from financial restrictions, compared to larger 
firms. The interaction with the ownership dummy is not statistically significant. In the 
accelerator model the cash flow coefficient for smaller firms is significantly larger. The 
interaction with the crisis dummy also confirms the previous results. However, the coefficient of 
the triple interaction size-crisis-cash flow is not significant. Finally, the Sargan test for 
overidentification has acceptable values in all specifications. 
  
 
                                                           
8 For all GMM estimations, the first step First Difference GMM estimators are reported using robust standard errors. 
The Sargan test is from the two-step estimation. Tje instruments are the lag two and three of net income and all 
model independent variables.  
  31Table 8.
Error-Correction Model for I/K
GMM Estimates, 1997-2000
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Usable observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Dy (t) 0.092 0.101 0.053 0.096 0.082 0.060 -0.033
(0.418) -(0.419) (0.426) -(1.256) (0.426) (0.435) (0.306)
k-y (t-1)  -1.268***  -1.271***  -1.290***  -1.256***  -1.253***  -1.290***  -1.645***
(0.330) (0.330) (0.325) (0.333) (0.337) (0.330) (0.424)
y (t-1)  -1.311***  -1.299***  -1.311***  -1.300***  -1.310***  -1.290***  -1.736***
(0.249) -(0.249) (0.257) (0.247) (0.250) (0.269) (0.415)
C/K (t) 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.013 0.055*** -0.029 -0.038 -0.013
(0.035) -(0.034) (0.073) (0.024) (0.284) (0.214) (0.053)
C/K (t-1) 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.224*** 0.209*** 0.205*** 0.226*** 0.213***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.041) (0.045)
Sum of C coef. 0.277 0.277 0.237 0.264 0.176 0.188 0.200
Size*C/K (t) -0.151 -0.287
(0.463) (0.540)
Crisis*C/K (t) 0.070 1.637** 0.078
(0.077) (0.925) (0.077)




R-squared 0.810 0.810 0.813 0.816 0.806 0.811 0.784
Wald 885 935 3011 2393 1078 3719 10833
Sargan 22.385 21.579 18.611 20.813 21.555 16.464 13.512
Notes: Variable definitions in Table 6.
          ***significant at 5%, **significant at 10%, *significant at 15%
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Table 9.
Accelerator Model for I/K
GMM Estimates, 1997-2000
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Usable observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
I/K (t-1) -0.055  -0.105** -0.061 -0.054 -0.048  -0.139* -0.060
(0.052) (0.064) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.095) (0.053)
Dy (t) 0.168 -0.080 0.126 0.215 0.140 -0.181 0.132
(0.427) (0.485) (0.429) (0.422) (0.436) (0.523) (0.429)
C/K (t) 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.035 0.093* -0.018 0.165 0.045
(0.011) (0.011) (0.138) (0.015) (0.502) (0.414) (0.142)
C/K (t-1) 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.351*** 0.319*** 0.315*** 0.401*** 0.347***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.016) (0.019) (0.049) (0.039)
Sum of C coef. 0.455 0.461 0.386 0.412 0.297 0.566 0.392
Size*C/K (t)  -3.343*  -4.007*
(2.194) (2.666)
Crisis*C/K (t) 0.112 2.784*** 0.264*
(0.138) (0.649) (0.177)




R-squared 0.641 0.434 0.642 0.650 0.636 0.295 0.642
Wald 2037 863 7304 3398 2557 4845 6900
Sargan 17.454 17.048 18.457 15.578 17.285 13.741 18.378
Notes: Variable definitions in Table 6.
          ***significant at 5%, **significant at 10%, *significant at 15%
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 with contribution margin (calculated as net operating income
9 plus 
capital depreciation) and 
K
Y
 with the sales to capital ratio. If the specification is correct  o α ,  2 α  
and  4 α  are expected to be positive and  1 α ,  3 α  and  5 α are expected to be negative. Recall also 
that the difference between the Euler equation for the case of no constraints (equation (14')) and 
the financially constrained Euler equation are the signs of the two debt terms. Therefore finding 
0 < 3 α and  0 4 > α  and significant is evidence that firms have hit the leverage ceiling. 
Alternatively finding  0 = 3 α and  0 4 < α  is consistent with the existence of a premium for debt 
and with a non-binding debt ceiling.  
Table 10, column A presents the econometric results of estimating equation (16) by 
GMM. Several augmented versions of the same regression were also considered to test its 
robustness and goodness of fit. The results are convincing. Most of the signs have the expected 
pattern and are significant. More relevant to the scope of this paper, the coefficient estimation for 
the squared debt to capital ratio is very significant and negative (the expected sign for the firms 
where the leverage ceiling is binding). This suggests the relevance of the extra financial 
constraints in equation (13) in the firm maximization problem shown in equations (11) and (12). 
The only reason for caution is that the debt to capital ratio has a negative sign but is not 
significant. The sign and significance of the coefficients of the interactions of the leverage terms 
with the various dummies do not lead to clear conclusions. The Sargan test of over-identifyng 
restrictions does not reject the specification in any of the models.  
 
                                                           
9 Net operating income is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
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Euler Equation 
GMM Estimates, 1997-2000 
(A) (B)  (C)  (D) 
Usable observations   157 157 157 157 
GI/K (t-1)  0.319** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.339***
(0.017) (0.168) (0.172) (0.171)
GI/K (t-1)  squared   -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.015***   -0.016***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Y/K (t-1)  0.025*** 0.023*** 0.002 0.026
(0.011) (0.010) (0.055) (0.023)
B/K (t-1)  -0.078 -0.039  -0.233** -0.177
(0.188) (0.188) (0.143) (0.208)
B/K (t-1)  squared  0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
MC/K (t-1)   -0.304**  -0.354*** -0.154  -0.245*
0.166 0.168 0.155 0.168
Size*B/K (t)  2.039
(1.495)
Size*Bsquared/K (t)  1.372
(1.690)
Crisis*B/K (t)  3.082
(5.022)
Crisis*Bsquared/K (t)  -0.031
(0.40)
Origin*B/K (t)  0.139*
(0.097)
Origin*Bsquared/K (t)   -0.005***
(0.002)
R-squared  0.536 0.527 0.579 0.533
Wald  15045 14631 37617 16520
Sargan  26.638 24.397 41.631 26.406
Notes: GI/K is the dependent variable. GI/K, gross investment over capital at the beginning of the period; 
           Y/K, sales over capital at the beginning of the period; B/K, total debt over capital at the beginning of the period; 
           MC/K, contribution margin over capital at the begining of the period;
           Crisis is the spread between foreign and domestic currency denominated interest rates.
          ***significant at 5%, **significant at 10%, *significant at 15%  
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6. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Three alternative specifications of an investment equation have been tested using panel data of 
Uruguayan firms: a traditional accelerator model of investment, an error-correction version of 
that accelerator model, and an Euler equation approach. These models of investment were used 
to test for the existence of financial constraints in the investment decision process. 
The more flexible (and ad hoc) error correction and accelerator models suggest that cash 
flow plays an important role in investment decisions. Moreover, there is evidence that financial 
restrictions are more severe for smaller firms. Additional evidence is found that financial 
constraints were tighter during the crisis years of 1999-2000, and this was particularly true for 
smaller firms. So there is evidence that the decrease in investment in 1999-2000 is associated 
with more severe credit conditions.  
The effects of ownership type on access to financial resources are also explored. 
Although it was conjectured that foreign-owned firms would suffer less severe restrictions, there 
was no supporting evidence to this effect. This is probably due to fact that most national firms in 
the database used in this paper are well-established, mature firms with respectable brand names.  
Taking into consideration the relative robustness of the results of the accelerator and error 
correction models, it can be said that the estimates confirm the presence of financial restrictions 
on investment decisions of the Uruguayan firms in the period under consideration (all estimates 
correspond to 1997-2000). Finally, the estimates of the Euler equation model confirm the 
importance of financial constraints for Uruguayan firms.  
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  38Appendix: Adjustment for Changes in Price Levels 
 
This appendix explains in detail the methodology employed to adjust the financial statements 
information to December 2000 values, including the computation of the effect of inflation on 
nominal accounts. While the importance of the distortion in accounting information generated by 
changes in price levels is widely recognized, the usual practice in Uruguay is to restrict the 
adjustment to the fixed assets item. So, a comprehensive adjustment was made to most of the 
financial statements included in the sample. 
As is common in Uruguay, fixed assets information is corrected for changes in price 
levels by using the Wholesale Price Index computed by the Central Bank. To make the 
comprehensive adjustment of financial statements for changes in price levels consistent with this 
criterion, the same index will be employed to compute the end-of-fiscal-year values of all the 
items. 
The Wholesale Price Index for month i in year t is denoted by  , and so   
represents the Wholesale Price Index for December 2000. 
P it , P 12 2000 ,
 
Balance Sheets Information Adjustment 
 
We will denote by   the value not adjusted for inflation of variable X in fiscal year t ended in 
month i. The same variable expressed in December 2000 values will be denoted by  . 
Xit ,
′ Xit ,
All the firms included in the sample make corrections for price level changes in the fixed 
assets and cumulated depreciation items. As cash, receivables, commercial liabilities and 
financial debt are usually expressed at end-of-fiscal-year values, the only item among the assets 
and liabilities that needs to be adjusted for price level changes is inventories. The balance of this 
item at end-of-fiscal-year reflects the cost of production or acquisition of units of goods at 
different points in time, so a correction is needed to express it at values of end-of-fiscal-year 
date. 
An accurate adjustment for inflation in the inventories item requires more detailed 
accounting information than the one usually revealed in financial statements, so an 
approximation was needed. Most of the firms in the sample compute the value of their cost of 
sales according the First-In, First-Out (FIFO) criteria, which means that the balance of the 
inventories at end-of-fiscal-year reflects the value of the units most recently produced or 
  39acquired. It was estimated that, on average, inventories were equivalent to three months of 
production, so its balance at end-of-fiscal-year cumulate the value of units produced during the 
last three months of the year, according to the FIFO method. 
If we represent by  ~











,  the average index for the three months previous to the 
end of the fiscal year, and by   the non-adjusted value of inventories according to the balance 
sheet at the end of fiscal year t, the December 2000 value of inventories at the end of fiscal year t 










12 2000  
The rest of the items that are included in the assets and liabilities of the firm are already 
expressed in figures valued at the end of the fiscal year. As was mentioned, all of the firms in the 
sample adjust their fixed assets to end-of-fiscal-year values, so this information is already 
corrected for inflation. Cash, receivables and liabilities denominated in Uruguayan pesos are, by 
definition, figures expressed in end-of-fiscal-year values. These same concepts, but originated in 
transactions denominated in foreign currency, are converted to pesos at the end-of-fiscal-year 
exchange rate, so these figures also correspond to end-of-fiscal-year values. For all of the 
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The net worth adjusted for inflation expressed in December 2000 values is just the 
difference between the adjusted values of assets and liabilities. There was not enough 
information available to decompose the adjusted value of net worth in its two main components: 
increases in equity by owners and retained earnings. 
 
Income Statement Information 
 
The items included in the income statements are flow variables, and their adjustment for changes 
in price levels cannot be done with the price index corresponding to the last month of the fiscal 
year, as was done in general for the items included in the balance sheet. It was assumed that 
  40income and expenses are distributed uniformly along the year, and so the adjustment to 
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P ,  is the average price index of the fiscal year ended in month i of 
year t. 
 
The only exception of this criteria was the computation of the adjusted cost of sales. The 
value of the cost of production Q not adjusted for inflation is given by: 
() QC II it it it it ,,, , =+− −1  
where C is cost of sales not adjusted and I inventories, as before. The cost of production 
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Given this estimation, the adjusted cost of sales was finally calculated according to the 
following: 
() ′ = ′ − ′ − ′ − CQ II it it it it ,,, , 1  
 
Correction for the Effect of Inflation on the Net Profit 
 
An estimation of the impact of inflation on the loss of value of the monetary assets of the firm 
was made. It was assumed that, while inventories and fixed assets adjust their value 
approximately in equal proportion to the changes in price levels, cash, receivables and liabilities 
do not adjust in the same manner. Strictly speaking, for cash, receivables and liabilities 
denominated in Uruguayan pesos there is no adjustment, while when they are denominated in 
foreign currency they are adjusted by the devaluation rate. In this way, this correction for the 
effect of inflation on monetary assets and liabilities can be interpreted as an adjustment of 
interest payments and the result of changes in the exchange rate to “real” terms. 
 
  41For the calculation, we defined Net Monetary Assets (M) as the difference between 
current assets excluded inventories (that is, in broad terms, cash and receivables) and total 
liabilities. The net result (loss if it is negative) attributed to changes in the price level, F, is given 
by the formula: 
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If initial M is positive and constant during the fiscal year, the first term in the right-hand 
side computes the loss of attributed to inflation of maintaining a certain level of net monetary 
assets during the exercise, and the second term will be zero. So the second term in the right-hand 
side computes the average loss derived from an increment in the initial net monetary position. If 
this position is negative, and decreases during the fiscal year, the firm will obtain a gain due to 
the price level change effect. 
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